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ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case

This is an appeal from the Judgment of Conviction of the Appellant, Shane Michael
Storer, entered on February 27, 2017. The trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Mr.
Storer by imposing a term of ten years' incarceration, with one year fixed, as well as by
suspending Mr. Storer's driver's license for eight years. Accordingly, the Judgment of
Conviction is appropriately vacated and the case remanded for resentencing.
B.

Course of Proceedings

On May 9, 2016 Mr. Storer was charged with one felony count of driving under the
influence (aggravated) in violation of Idaho Code § 18-8006; one felony count of leaving the
scene of an accident in violation of Idaho Code § 18-8007; one felony count of eluding a police
officer in violation of Idaho Code § 49-1404(2)(a); one misdemeanor count of possession of a
controlled substance in violation of Idaho Code § 37-2732(C); and one misdemeanor count of
possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of Idaho Code § 37-2734A. (R., p. 009-011.) Mr.
Storer waived his preliminary hearing on June 29, 2016. (R., p. 036.)
On August 25, 2016 Mr. Storer pied not guilty to all counts and the matter was set for a
pretrial conference and jury trial. (R., p. 065.) At the pretrial conference on December 29, 2016
Mr. Storer pied guilty to Counts I and III, felony aggravated DUI and felony eluding, and the
State dismissed the remaining counts. (R., p. 071-080.)
On February 24, 2017 Mr. Storer was sentenced to ten years' incarceration on Count I,
with one year fixed. (R., p. 081-088.) Mr. Storer was sentenced to five years' incarceration, with
no fixed term and to run concurrently, on Count III. (Id.) The sentence was imposed. (Id.)
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Mr. Starer's driver's license was suspended absolutely for three years on Count III, and a
further five years, with one year absolute, on Count I, to run consecutively upon Mr. Starer's
release from incarceration:
Thus, his driver's license will be suspended for a total period of 8 years, the first 4 year(s)
Defendant shall have absolutely no driving privileges of any kind. Defendant may
thereafter be eligible for restricted privileges for the last 4 years, upon proper application
showing good cause. Defendant may be granted restricted privileges, provided that he can
only drive a vehicle equipped with a state-approved functioning ignition interlock device
installed on any vehicle that he owns or operates.
(R., 086.)
Mr. Storer timely appealed his judgment of conviction on March 15, 2017. (R., 090-094.)
C.

Factual History

On May 5, 2016 Mr. Storer was drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana with friends at
and around Sud's Tavern in Boise. (Confidential Exhibit Presentence Report ("PSR"), Report of
Andrea Fielder ("Fielder Rep."), 4.) Mr. Storer attempted to drive home at excessive speed and

disregarded attempts by law enforcement to pull his vehicle over. (PSR, Fielder Rep., 3.) Mr.
Storer collided with the rear of a vehicle stopped at a red light at the intersection of the 1-84 exit
ramp and Meridian Road. (Id.) Mr. Storer continued driving his vehicle until it became disabled
shortly after the collision. (Id.)
The driver of the vehicle struck by Mr. Storer, Stefanie Jafek, suffered a broken rib and
clavicle. (Id.) Mr. Storer was transported to the hospital and subsequently to the Ada County Jail
where a search revealed marijuana and paraphernalia on his person. (Id.) A blood test of Mr.
Storer reflected a BAC of.224. (Tr., p. 11, L. 2-16.)
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ISSUES ON APPEAL

1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in sentencing Mr. Storer to a term of ten

years' incarceration, with one year fixed, on Count I, and to a term of five years' incarceration
with no fixed term on Count III and imposing such sentence, and suspending Mr. Storer's
driver's license for eight years, with four years' absolute?
ARGUMENT

A.

Standard ofAppellate Review
Sentencing is a matter committed to the discretion of the trial judge, and the defendant

has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on appeal. State v. Rice, 99 Idaho 752, 752,
5 88 P .2d 951, 951 ( 1979). The fixed period of a sentence is the term of confinement for purposes
ofreview. State v. Kysar, 116 Idaho 992, 999, 783 P.2d 859, 866 (1989).
A trial court abuses its discretion "where the sentence is unreasonable." State v.

Brizendine, 123 Idaho 886,888,853 P.2d 631,633 (Ct. App. 1993). "To determine whether a
court has abused its discretion in sentencing, we must conduct an independent review of the
record, focusing upon both the nature of the offense and the character of the offender." State v.

Croston, 124 Idaho 471, 472, 860 P.2d 674, 675 (Ct. App. 1993). A sentence is reviewed in light
of "the nature of the offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public
interest." State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978) (quoting ABA STANDARDS
RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES at 11 (Approved Draft 1968)). A sentence is
unreasonable ifit is excessive under the facts of the case and in consideration ofthe four
objectives of sentencing: the protection of society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.

State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 146, 814 P.2d 401,406 (1991); see also State v. Toohill, 103
Idaho 565, 650 P.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1982).
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The general objectives of a review of a trial court's sentencing are:
(1) to correct the sentence which is excessive in length, having regard to the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest;
(2) to facilitate the rehabilitation of the offender by affording him an opportunity to assert
grievances he may have regarding his sentence;
(3) to promote respect for law by correcting abuses of the sentencing power and by
increasing the fairness of the sentencing process; and
(4) to promote the development and application of criteria for sentencing which are both
rational and just.

State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385,393,825 P.2d 482,490 (1992).
B.

The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Sentencing Mr. Storer.
As discussed supra, Mr. Storer was sentenced to a term of ten years' incarceration, with

one year fixed, on Count I, as well as a five year term of incarceration, to run concurrently, on
Count III. The district court imposed the sentence. Mr. Storer recognizes that the sentences
imposed on each count fall within the statutory maximums. Aggravated DUI, to which Mr.
Storer pied guilty in Count I, carries maximum penalties of fifteen years' incarceration, a
$5,000.00 fine, and a driver's license suspension of one to five years. I. C. § 18-8006. Felony
eluding, to which Mr. Storer pied guilty in Count III, carries a maximum penalty of five years'
incarceration, an absolute driver's license suspension of one to three years, and a $50,000.00
fine. I. C. §§ 49-1404(3); 18-112.
Having established that Mr. Storer' s sentence fell within the bounds of the statutory
maximums, the analysis turns to whether the sentence was nonetheless unreasonable and
constitutes an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. As discussed in further detail,

ante, there are two facts of primary significance that interweave through all the sentencing
factors and considerations. First, both the PSR and highly respected experts recommended a
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sentence of probation, a far cry from the court's imposition of a term of incarceration. Second,
Mr. Starer's criminal conduct is inextricably and directly linked to his struggles with the illness
of alcohol addiction, raising the question of whether the term of incarceration imposed by the
court appropriately weighed the competing penal interests of protection of society, deterrence,
rehabilitation, and retribution
1.

Mr. Storer's Nature, Offense, and Protection of the Public's Interest.

Mr. Starer's sentence is excessive when considering his nature, offense, and the
protection of the public interest. See State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (I 978)
(A sentence is reviewed in light of "the nature of the offense, the character of the offender and
the protection of the public interest.").

a.

Mr. Storer 's Nature.

Mr. Storer is the archetypal example of a contributing member of society who made an
extremely poor decision while self-medicating, primarily with alcohol, and battling the illness of
addiction. The prosecuting attorney noted that Mr. Storer as naturally a good person suffering
from an illness in the form of alcohol addiction: "[Mr. Storer] is a good person. He's a good kid .
. . . he's ultimately a good kid that has a problem with alcohol .... " (Tr., p. 28, L. 13-15.) The
trial court noted that Mr. Storer comes "from a pretty good background." (Tr., p. 45, L. 25.) Mr.
Storer graduated from high school and successfully completed three years of college studies at
the University of Utah. (Tr., p. 46, L. 8-11.) At the time of his crime Mr. Storer was six credits
short of attaining a bachelor's degree in strategic communications. (Tr., p. 11, L. 17-25; PSR,

Fielder Rep., 9.) As demonstrated by the numerous letters of support submitted on his behalf,
ample family and friends deeply care about and believe in Mr. Storer and provide him a deep
well of support. (PSR, Letters ofSupport.)
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Despite his intelligence and fortunate upbringing, Mr. Storer battles the illness of alcohol
addiction, and such battle undisputedly caused him significant personal struggles at times. Mr.
Storer's GAIN assessment concluded that Mr. Storer suffers from Alcohol Use Disorder and
Cannabis Use Disorder. (PSR, GAIN Assessment dated January 18, 2017 ("GAIN"), 2.) Mr.
Storer's GAIN recommended he undergo Level II.I Intensive Outpatient treatment for his
addiction. (Id., 12.) Mr. Storer also underwent a Forensic Mental Health Examination
administered by Dr. Craig Beaver which similarly concluded that Mr. Storer suffers from
Alcohol Use Disorder and Cannabis Use Disorder, as well as depression. (PSR, Forensic Mental

Health Examination of Dr. Craig Beaver dated November 16, 2016 ("Beaver Rep."), 8-9.) Dr.
Beaver also recommended intensive outpatient treatment for Mr. Storer's addictions, as well as
prescription medication for his depression. (Id.) Significantly, both the GAIN assessment and Dr.
Beaver's assessment of Mr. Storer are consistent in their conclusions that Mr. Storer's issues are
limited to alcohol and drug addiction. A mental health examination performed by the Department
of Health and Welfare concluded that Mr. Storer "does not appear to have an elevated risk
related to mental health issues." (PSR, DHW Mental Health Examination Report by Michelle

Schildhauer, 2.)
Recognizing his addictions and the seriousness of his misconduct, Mr. Storer
unequivocally accepted responsibility for the crime he committed and pied guilty. As Mr. Storer
wrote to Ms. Jafek, "[m]y living amends to you are how I can change my behavior to ensure that
nothing like this ever happens again .... I will continue to use [the incident] as a driving force of
change in my life ...." (Tr., p. 43, L. 11-21; PSR, Storer Letter to Jafek.) The court also noted
Mr. Storer's acceptance of responsibility: "You clearly accepted responsibility; were very
remorseful." (Tr., p, 46, L. 2-3.) The PSR noted Mr. Storer's "remorse and shame is genuine"
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 6

(PSR, Fielder Rep., 15.) Mr. Storer ensured that Ms. Jafek was fully compensated for her

damages civilly. (PSR, Letter ofJohn Howell dated February 23, 2017, 1.)
Mr. Starer's words were not hollow. "Mr. Storer recognizes that substance abuse
treatment services are necessary for him." (PSR, Fielder Rep., 12.) On May 30, 2016, very
shortly after the incident, Mr. Storer began the recommended intensive outpatient treatment at
Ashwood Recovery. (Id.) At Ashwood, Dr. Coire Weather described Mr. Storer as "compliant
and motivated" and noted that Mr. Storer "followed through with my recommendations." (PSR,
Weather Letter.) Erica Lopez, Mr. Starer's clinical supervisor at Ashwood, noted that Mr. Storer

"has been compliant and an appropriate peer at the group level, we have enjoyed having him and
watching him grow in the recovery process." (PSR, Lopez Letter.) Ms. Lopez noted that Mr.
Storer had "negative urinalysis testing while at this facility for treatment." (Id.; see also PSR,
Ashwood Recovery Drug Testing Results.) The court noted that Mr. Storer "certainly had no

positive UAs while on pretrial release." (Tr., p. 46, L. 9-10.)
The body of evidence regarding Mr. Storer's nature demonstrates that he is a good,
contributing member of society who suffers from the illness of addiction which caused him to
make a terrible mistake for which he has taken responsibility and seriously engaged in lifechanging recovery.
b.

Nature of Mr. Storer 's Offense.

Regarding the offense, little can be added at this juncture. Such position in no way
minimizes the seriousness of Mr. Storer's crime. Rather, it reflects the fact that Mr. Storer
acknowledged the seriousness of the offense and unequivocally accepted responsibility. A lone
point is worth making. At sentencing the court stated that Mr. Storer "[m]ight have killed [Ms.
Jafek], might have killed who knows how many others." (Tr., p. 46, L. 23-24.) Without
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 7

minimizing the seriousness of Mr. Starer's offense, it is appropriate to exercise caution in
sentencing based on hypothetical damage. Every person who drives a vehicle while over the
legal limit could theoretically kill someone, and that potential is accounted for in the minimum
punishments attendant to the crime. Attempted crimes carry less severe penalties than
culminated, damage-causing crimes because our system recognizes that crimes causing harm are
appropriately punished more severely than attempts. In the tort context, liability on the part of a
defendant may be readily established, but absent damages the unlawful conduct itself is often unremedied. It is accurate to hypothesize that Mr. Storer could have killed someone, but the fact is
that he did not do so. To the extent the court actually relied on speculative, potential harm that
did not occur in sentencing Mr. Storer, such reliance was inappropriate. See, e.g., State v.

Rettmann, 218 Or. App. 179, 186, 178 P.3d 333, 336 (2008) ("We do not mean to suggest that it
is appropriate to consider theoretical harms that an offense . . . could have caused, as the
prosecutor appears to have suggested at the sentencing hearing."); United States v. Chapman,
694 F.3d 908, 916 (7th Cir. 2012) ("sentencing decisions cannot rest on speculation or baseless
allegations of harm."); Smith v. State, 484 So. 2d 649, 651 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) ("The trial
court's speculation as to what might have happened does not constitute a valid reason for
departing from the guidelines.")

c.

Protection of the Public Interest.

The last Wolfe factor, protection of the public interest, overlaps heavily, if not
completely, with the sentencing objectives discussed in Section B.II, ante, and will not be
separately discussed.
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2.

Sentencing Objectives.

Mr. Starer's sentence is excessive and, in totality, fails to serve the four sentencing
objectives, protection of society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution described in State v.
Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141,814 P.2d 401 (1991) and State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565,650 P.2d
707 (Ct. App. 1982).
a.

Mr. Storer 's Sentence is Excessive.

Mr. Storer's imposed sentence often years' incarceration, with one year fixed, along with
eight years' driver's license suspension, is clearly excessive under the facts of this case. Both
facets of the punishment will make it exceedingly difficult for Mr. Storer to re-enter society as a
contributing and gainfully-employed member thereof. As the court noted, it was Mr. Starer's
"first felony." (Tr., p. 46, L. 1-2.) Perhaps most striking is the PSR's comparison of Mr. Starer's
sentence to like offenders. In an admittedly small sample size of two cases, the comparison is
nonetheless stark: "there were a total of 2 offenders who had a similar age, gender, number of
criminal convictions, LSI-R score, and instant offense as [Mr. Storer]. Of these 2 offenders, I
was sentenced to probation, I offender was sentenced to Retained Jurisdiction, and O offenders
were sentenced to term." (PSR, Fielder Rep., 14.) This comparison is unsurprising because Mr.
Storer's "adult criminal record consists of no prior misdemeanor convictions." (Id., at 15.) By
imposing Mr. Starer's term of incarceration and declining probation or a rider, the court
punished Mr. Storer more severely than the two comparable offenders sentenced in Idaho in the
last decade for the same offenses. It is incomprehensible that Mr. Storer could be a "worse"
candidate for probation or retained jurisdiction given his lack of criminal record, unequivocal
acceptance of responsibility, proximity to college graduation, sobriety, exemplary performance
in intensive outpatient treatment, and the lack of fatalities in the incident.
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The court considered retaining jurisdiction, but declined that option because Mr. Storer
had done so well in treatment:
I pretty quickly decided that a rider was not necessary or really even appropriate in this
case. Often times that's to give people a four, six, eight month stab at getting started in
rehab and then you hope with probation terms they can continue. It seems to me that you
already got a good start at the rehab and I just don't think that a rider was necessary.
(Tr., p. 47, L. 6-13.)

It defies reason that the court would reject a lesser sentence as unnecessary due to a
defendant's exemplary and substantial progress, then proceed to impose a harsher sentence. It
appears that, paradoxically, Mr. Storer earned himself a harsher sentence of incarceration by
doing so well in his pre-sentencing rehabilitation as to render a rider superfluous in the eyes of
the court. Presumably and given its comments, the court would have sentenced Mr. Storer to a
rider had he not been doing well in his treatment, thereby essentially creating a perverse
incentive for defendants to not perform well in pre-sentencing treatment in the hopes of being
sentenced to a rider, a less severe punishment than incarceration. Generally speaking, upon
successful completion of a rider, a defendant then proceeds to probation, and the court alluded to
this path by noting that a rider give people a start, "and then you hope with probation terms they
can continue." (Id. (emphasis added).) A defendant sentenced to a rider who fails thereon will
almost certainly have their sentence imposed. Rarely, if ever, does a defendant successfully
complete a rider, demonstrate legitimate progress, and is then rewarded with imposition of a
prison sentence. If, in the eyes of the court, Mr. Storer's rehabilitative progress at the time of
sentencing was the analog of having successfully completed a rider, then the "probation terms"
referenced by the court was the appropriate next step, not a term of incarceration.
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Indeed, the PSR recommended probation: "it is my belief that Mr. Storer would be an
appropriate candidate for community supervision." (PSR, Fielder Rep., 15.) Dr. Beaver similarly
recommended probation and went so far as to conclude that incarceration would be explicitly
detrimental to Mr. Starer's recovery from his addiction illness:
Shane Storer shows much greater potential compared to other defendants in this type of
circumstance for rehabilitation and success in life . . . . If Shane Storer is given the
opportunity to remain in the community, complete his treatment, and maintain
employment, he has an excellent chance of being a productive, contributing citizen .... I
am concerned that sending Shane Storer to prison at this point in his life will not improve
his chance of success in dealing effectively with his chemical dependency issues and will
add many more barriers for him continuing to turn his life around and be successful as an
adult.

(PSR, Beaver Rep., 10.)
Tellingly, neither of Mr. Storer's crimes carries a minimum term of incarceration,
meaning that the legislature has concluded that these crimes, though clearly serious, do not
necessarily justify a term of incarceration. Thus, to impose a term of incarceration and maximum
license suspension, the court cannot have concluded anything other than Mr. Storer represents
essentially the worse possible offender and violation of these statutes, a conclusion that defies
reason in light of Mr. Storer's excellent treatment performance prior to sentencing, the lesser
sentences of Mr. Storer's comparable defendants, and the probation recommendations of the PSR
and Dr. Beaver. The only conclusion is that Mr. Storer's sentence is unreasonably excessive.
b.

Mr. Storer 's Sentence does not Serve to Protect Society.

The court stated that Mr. Storer's sentence was not imposed to protect society or the
public: "I'm not so sure that [incarceration is] necessary for protection of the public. As Dr.
Engle [sic], I would agree with him, that if you continued in treatment, that you would not be a
danger to the public." (Tr., p. 49, L. 2-4.)
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The PSR agreed with the court's conclusion regarding Mr. Starer's danger to the public
because it recommended probation as the appropriate sentence. (PSR, Fielder Rep., 15.)
Similarly, Dr. Beaver also concluded that Mr. Storer "is at low risk for re-offense and any
aggressive acting-out behaviors." (Beaver Rep., 10.)
Furthermore, the PSR concluded that Mr. Storer was a low risk to reoffend, given his
LSI-R score of 15.0. (Id., at 14-15.) Ironically, the court increased Mr. Starer's chances of reoffending, and thus harming the public, by incarcerating him. On probation as recommended and
given his low LSI-R score, Mr. Storer had a 7.5% chance to recidivate, but after incarceration
Mr. Storer has a 9.2% chance to recidivate. (Id., at 15.)

c.

Deterrence.

Deterrence is the sole basis cited by the court for imposing a term of incarceration on Mr.
Storer: "I believe [imposition of the sentence is] necessary for both specific and general deterrent
purposes." (Tr., p. 48, L.25-p. 49, L. 1.)
Deterrence is a subjective, amorphous concept that defies easy quantification. How much
deterrence is sufficient? How much deterrence is excessive? This principle is easily illustrated at
the extreme ends of the spectrum, less so in the middle. It is easy to understand that a sentence of
probation for first degree murder does serve to sufficiently deter such egregious conduct.
Likewise, a sentence of 25 years for petty theft, though undoubtedly having a strongly deterrent
effect on future petty thefts, is undisputedly excessive and likely constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment.
Indeed, it could be argued as a policy matter that strong criminal penalties could wholly
eradicate most, if not all, crime. If driving with any amount of BAC over 0.00 resulted in a five
year term of incarceration and lifetime driver's license suspension, it is safe to presume that
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instances of driving under the influence would approach zero. The absolute deterrent effect of
such stringent penalties would be unquestioned, and no doubt lives saved and injuries prevented,
but at great societal cost. Largely contributing members of society would be wholly removed
therefrom, decreasing productivity and the tax base, as well as potentially orphaning children and
straining our social safety nets. The prisoner population would simultaneously swell, greatly
burdening society even further.
The foregoing illustration demonstrates precisely why deterrence is but one component
of sentencing, and the benefits thereof must be weighed against other factors such as
rehabilitation. In this case Mr. Storer cannot reasonably argue that, in a vacuum, his sentence
does not have a deterrent effect on the future conduct of both himself personally and society as a
whole.
The question, however, is whether the deterrent value of Mr. Starer's sentence is more
than reasonably necessary, and undermines the other goals of sentencing. Mr. Starer's "remorse
and shame is genuine" (PSR, Fielder Rep., 15.), indicating the goal of specific deterrence had
been accomplished prior to sentencing. Furthermore, as discussed in Section B.2.a, supra, and
Section B.2.d, ante, Mr. Starer's sentence is excessive and hinders the penal goal of
rehabilitation.
Regarding general deterrence, the court could have amply and ably deterred others from
engaging in similar future conduct by sentencing Mr. Storer to some combination of fines,
probation, a period of jail, a rider, and driver's license suspension while not sacrificing the penal
goal of rehabilitation. It stretches credulity to imagine that a person contemplating driving under
the influence would consider a combination of a felony conviction, fines, probation, a period of
jail, a rider, and/or driver's license suspension to be an acceptable risk, but that such person
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would consider the added potential of incarceration to shift such risk from acceptable to
unacceptable. Under either punitive scenario that person will be a felon and living with such
consequences for the rest of their life. The deterrent effect of the punishments short of
incarceration is ample and more than sufficient, and, had the legislature considered incarceration
absolutely necessary to deter such conduct, a mandatory term of incarceration would not be
absent from the crimes to which Mr. Storer pied guilty.
d.

Rehabilitation.

Rehabilitation is a vastly important component of our criminal justice system. While
acknowledging the seriousness of criminal offenses and punishing accordingly is important, none
can rationally argue that society does not gain when those who offend and are punished therefor
subsequently become contributing, tax-paying members of society who do not recidivate.
Admittedly some repeat offenders might be beyond rehabilitation, but the chances to
successfully rehabilitate those for whom rehabilitation is likely cannot be lightly disregarded.

See, e.g., Nickoli v. State, 1992 WL 12153654, at *I (Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 12, 1992) ("Judge
Souter accepted the evidence of Nickoli's high potential for rehabilitation and declared that
rehabilitation was the single most important goal in sentencing Nickoli. However, Judge Souter
also declared that the seriousness ofNickoli's crime could not be ignored.")
In this case Mr. Storer's rehabilitation was unequivocally and significantly hindered by
the court imposing a term of incarceration and significant driver's license suspension. The PSR
recognized the benefit in prioritizing Mr. Storer's rehabilitation given his exceedingly low LSI-R
score and recidivism risk:
[Mr. Storer] does not have a significant criminal record. He has never been convicted of a
violent offense. He seems to have a positive, prosocial support system in the community,
being his family, close family friends, and sober peers. He has stable housing and
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employment. He is taking prescription mental health medication, and is participating in
counseling. He is actively involved in AA/NA and weekly substance abuse treatment
classes. It does not seem as though he poses a risk to the community at this time ... it is
my belief that Mr. Storer would be an appropriate candidate for community supervision,
given that he continues his current mental health and substance use treatment
interventions.

(PSR, Fielder Rep., 15.)
Dr. Beaver concurred in the PSR's recommendation that Mr. Storer would be best-served
by probation and continued rehabilitation:
Shane Storer shows much greater potential compared to other defendants in this type of
circumstance for rehabilitation and success in his life. Fortunately, these events have
taken place at a young age. He has pursued appropriate treatment, appears to be
participatory and to have accepted his need to abstain from any substance use. He has
strong intellectual abilities, is close to completing his college education and has strong
family support, both for his sobriety and continued success. If Shane Storer is given the
opportunity to remain in the community, complete his treatment, and maintain
employment, he has an excellent chance of being a productive, contributing citizen.

(Beaver Rep., 10.)
Significantly, Dr. Beaver went a step further and concluded that incarcerating Mr. Storer
would be detrimental to Mr. Storer's ability to overcome his alcohol addiction and rehabilitate
into a productive, contributing member of society: "I am concerned that sending Shane Storer to
prison at this point in his life will not improve his chance of success in dealing effectively with
his chemical dependency issues and will add many more barriers for him continuing to turn his
life around and be successful as an adult." (Id.)
At the time of sentencing, it is undisputed that Mr. Storer had made, and was continuing
to make, significant progress overcoming his addictions. As the court noted, Mr. Storer
"certainly had no positive UAs while on pretrial release." (Tr., p. 46, L. 9-10.) Dr. Coire Weather
of Ashwood Recovery described Mr. Storer as "compliant and motivated" and noted that Mr.
Storer "followed through with my recommendations." (PSR, Weather Letter.) Erica Lopez, Mr.
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Starer's clinical supervisor at Ashwood, noted that Mr. Storer "has been compliant and an
appropriate peer at the group level, we have enjoyed having him and watching him grow in the
recovery process." (PSR, Lopez Letter.)
Indeed, Mr. Starer's rehabilitation was going so well that the court ruled out the lesser
sentencing option of a rider:
I pretty quickly decided that a rider was not necessary or really even appropriate in this
case. Oftentimes that's to give people a four, six, eight month stab at getting started in
rehab and then you hope with probation terms they can continue. It seems to me that you
already got a good start at the rehab and I just don't think that a rider was necessary.
(Tr., p. 47, L. 6-13.)
Rather than permitting Mr. Storer to continue, under the watchful eye of supervised
probation, on the rehabilitative path upon which he was making significant progress, the court
unreasonably halted that progress and severely jeopardized Mr. Starer's chances of becoming a
rehabilitated and productive member of society. The court, in the face of all contrary evidence
and expert recommendations, appears to have not just minimized, but wholly and unreasonably
disregarded Mr. Starer's rehabilitation.

e.

Retribution.

Though the court did not make explicit reference to its sentence as retributive, comments
thereby lead to the inescapable conclusion that Mr. Starer's sentence was primarily retributive in
nature, and the court certainly satisfied its retributive goal by imposing a term of incarceration on
Mr. Storer. The court stated:
[t]his was a very serious violent collision. Caused serious personal injuries to an innocent
victim. Might have killed her, might have killed who knows how many others. You put
many people in the public at risk with serious alcohol issues that had gotten to the point
where you binge drink to excess and frequently to blackout. You got kicked out of your
fraternity for fighting and drinking.
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(Tr., p. 46, L. 21-p. 47, L. 3.) The court, in describing Mr. Storer's conduct, took on a personal,
editorial tone, referring to Mr. Storer's failure to yield at a red light as "blast[ing] through the red
light." (Tr., p. 5, L. 3-4.)
Suffice to say, given the emphasis placed on Mr. Storer's offense, the actual damage it
caused, the theoretical damage it could have caused, the editorial nature of its descriptions
thereof, and the imposition of a term of incarceration for a first felony offense, more than
sufficient emphasis was placed on the retributive aspect of Mr. Storer's sentence by the court.
3.

The Overall Picture - Synthesizing the Sentencing Factors.

When all the requisite factors, namely Mr. Storer' s nature, the nature of his offense,
protection of society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution, are considered in totality, it is
evident that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a term of incarceration on Mr. Storer,
as well as suspending his driver's license to the maximum extent permitted by statute.
The court abused its discretion by essentially boiling sentencing down to two factors:
deterrence and retribution as discussion of these factors formed the consistent thrust and
substance of the court's sentencing colloquy. The court wholly ignored, or at most made minimal
reference to, the extensive evidence from probation and diverse experts related to the other
factors such as Mr. Storer's nature, rehabilitation, and protection of society. Such focus on
selected factors and minimization or ignorance of those not fitting the court's pre-determined
narrative at sentencing constitutes an abuse of discretion such that resentencing is appropriate.
Mr. Storer recognizes that the abuse of discretion standard of review for sentences is a
difficult one to overcome and the trial court is afforded wide discretion, but, conversely, a
mechanism of review is meaningless if it is nothing more than rubber stamp of the trial court. An
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abuse of discretion standard of review may be satisfied only in rare instances, but such rarity
does not mean abuses do not occur, and Mr. Storer's case represents such abuse.
As noted in State v. Brown:
The general objectives of a review of a trial court's sentencing are:
(1) to correct the sentence which is excessive in length, having regard to the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest;

(2) to facilitate the rehabilitation of the offender by affording him an opportunity to assert
grievances he may have regarding his sentence;
(3) to promote respect for law by correcting abuses of the sentencing power and by
increasing the fairness of the sentencing process; and
(4) to promote the development and application of criteria for sentencing which are both
rational and just.
121 Idaho 385,393,825 P.2d 482,490 (1992).
Each of these goals of appellate review are satisfied by remanding Mr. Storer's case for
resentencing. As extensively discussed in Section B.1 and B.2, supra, Mr. Storer's sentence is
excessive and constitutes an abuse of discretion in light of his nature, offense, and the protection
of society.
Resentencing will aid Mr. Storer's rehabilitation tremendously. Incarceration abruptly
ended Mr. Storer's very successful rehabilitation and, as Dr. Beaver opined, increased the
difficulty and chances of success of Mr. Storer's rehabilitation. Indeed, Mr. Storer's LSI-R score
indicates his incarceration makes him more, not less, likely to recidivate.
Resentencing will promote respect for the law by correcting the court's abuse of its
sentencing power in Mr. Storer's case. The court sentenced Mr. Storer significantly more harshly
than both comparable offenders sentenced in the last decade, despite his undisputedly successful
rehabilitation and extensive support. Such draconian sentencing reduces fairness in the
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sentencing process, dis-incentivizes and de-emphasizes pre-sentencing rehabilitation efforts by
remorseful defendants, and increases the chances of recidivism and unsuccessful re-entry into
society. For these same reasons resentencing will promote the development and application of
criteria for sentencing which are both rational and just.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Storer respectfully asks this Court to vacate the
imposition of sentence and remand this matter for further proceedings.
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